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The World Gas Model 
A Multi-Period Mixed Complementarity Model 









We provide the description and illustrative results of the World Gas Model, a multi-period 
complementarity model for the global natural gas market. Market players include
producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, LNG liquefiers and regasifiers as well as 
marketers. The model data set contains more than 80 countries and regions and covers 98% 
of world wide natural gas production and consumption. We also include a detailed 
representation of cross-border natural gas pipelines and constraints imposed by long-term 
contracts in the LNG market. The Base Case results of our numerical simulations show that 
the rush for LNG observed in the past years will not be sustained throughout 2030 and that 
Europe will continue to rely on pipeline gas for a large share of its imports and
consumption.  
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1  Introduction 
The World Gas Model (WGM) is a multi-period numerical equilibrium model of the 
global natural gas market covering the next three decades. It includes more than 80 
countries and over 98% of global natural gas production and consumption (in 2005, BP 
2008). The WGM allows for endogenous investments in pipelines and storage capacities, 
as well as for expansion of regasification and liquefaction capacities and considers 
demand growth, production capacity expansions and price and cost increases over time. 
Taking into account the game-theoretic aspects of the imperfectly competitive natural gas 
market, the model includes market power à la Cournot for some players participating in 
natural gas trade (i.e., traders and regasifiers.) 
This paper documents the 2008 version of the World Gas Model that was used in 
Egging et al. (2009) and Huppmann et al. (2009). This model was based on the work of 
Gabriel et al. (2005a, b) which established existence and uniqueness results for a class of 
gas market models and then applied their model to the North American market. 
Huppmann and Egging (2009) provide a more detailed programmers’ and user 
manual. WGM is a deterministic model, assuming perfect information and foresight. A 
stochastic extension of the WGM was presented in Egging and Holz (2009). 
Compared to earlier equilibrium models of international natural gas markets (e.g., 
Egging et al. 2008, Lise and Hobbs 2008, Holz et al. 2008, Zwart 2009), the World Gas 
Model is unique with its combination of: 
•  the level of detail for the market agents, 
•  the level of detail for the transport options (pipeline, LNG), 
•  the breadth of the regional coverage, 
•  the multi-period approach with endogenous capacity expansions, 
•  the inclusion of multiple seasons and seasonal arbitrage by storage operators, 
•  the representation of market power. 
The World Gas Model is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). 
The concept of MCP is briefly introduced in the following paragraph.    
1.1 Mixed  Complementarity  Problems 
Complementarity modeling provides a very general mathematical framework that can be 
applied in many different fields. Cottle et al. (1992) and Bazaraa et al. (2004) provide 
extensive introductions on various variants of complementarity problems. In equilibrium 
modeling of energy markets mixed complementarity problems are increasingly used, 
implementing them through the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions and market-
clearing conditions.  
MCPs are a generalization of pure nonlinear complementarity problems (NCPs). 
MCPs also allow for other than zero lower bounds as well as upper bounds to the 
variables for which a solution must be determined.  
In NCP a vector x must be determined, so that: 0 ≤  x ⊥ F(x) ≥ 0.
1 To facilitate 
comparison with the MCP formulation, another way to put this is that for each element xi: 
xi >0   F i(x) = 0 
In a MCP, however, a vector x must be found for which for each element xi:  
i.  li= xi     Fi(x) ≥ 0 
ii.  li <xi<ui    Fi(x) = 0 
iii.  xi=ui     Fi(x) ≤ 0 
where li and ui are lower and upper bounds, respectively. The MCP formulation can 
represent characteristics prevailing in natural gas markets. From natural lower bounds 
such as non-negativity of volumes and contractual minimal deliveries, to upper bounds 
such as limits on daily production rates, or pipeline capacities. Moreover, the KKTs used 
in the MCP can be the optimality conditions of strategic players exerting market power 
which allows for the modeling of imperfect markets. 
The World Gas Model is based on behavioral assumptions of representative players 
that are active in the global natural gas markets. The following section presents the 
optimization problems and constraints for all the player types represented in the model as 
well as the Karush Kuhn Tucker conditions and market-clearing conditions that together 
formulate the mixed complementarity model. In Section 3, the data set is described. We 
                                                 
1 This is shorthand for: all elements of vector x are non-negative xi ≥0; all vector function values are non-
negative: Fi(x) ≥ 0; and complementarity i.e., xi
T Fi(x) =0 for all indices i. 
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present illustrative results obtained with the WGM for a Base Case until 2030/2040 in 
Section 4 before we conclude and provide an outlook on further research. 
 
2  Model Formulation 
In this section, the deterministic multi-period MCP model for the global natural gas 
market is introduced. For each player type the objective function and constraints and the 
related Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are presented as well as the market-clearing 
constraints, which are equations that tie the separate players’ problems together into one 
MCP. While we take into account that there is strategic behavior and market power in 
parts of the natural gas market, we must limit this behavioral assumption to only certain 
market agents that sell gas to the final consumption sectors. 
2.1  The World Gas Model 
Natural gas consumption and production can be found in all world regions However, 
there are big differences between the regions. North America and Eurasia have well-
developed gas pipeline systems to transport the gas from suppliers to consumers, possibly 
crossing several country borders on the way. In other parts of the world, pipeline 
transmission systems are much less developed. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is used to 



















Figure 1: Country nodes included in WGM 
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Table 1: Market participants represented in the WGM 
Actor   Role  Comment 
Producer  Produces natural gas and supplies it to its trading 
arm and – if applicable – domestic liquefiers. 
 
Trader  Buys gas from producers and sells it to marketers 





Assigns pipeline capacity to traders who need to 
transport gas from one country to another. 
 
Liquefier  Buys gas from the producer, liquefies it and sells it 





Facilitate the oversea-transport of Liquefied 
Natural Gas from liquefiers to regasifiers. 
Represented in the model by 
distance-dependent costs and 
losses. 
Regasifier  Buys gas from liquefiers and sells it to the   




Buys gas in the low demand season from traders 
and – if applicable – regasifiers and sells it to the 
market in the high and peak demand season to take 





Responsible for pipeline network expansions.    
Marketer  Buys natural gas from traders, regasifiers and 
storage operators and distributes it to end-users. 
Represented by the aggregate 
inverse demand curve of the 
consumer segments 
End users  The three consumption sectors: power generation, 
industry and residential/commercial. 
See marketer 
 
The different aspects of individual regions must be addressed in the data set when 
setting up a model. Infrastructure and market characteristics must be represented at an 
adequately detailed level to be able to draw useful conclusions. However, many of the 
desired data are not publicly available, and thus there are limits to the level of detail that 
can be used. 
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Figure 1 shows an overview of the – nearly 80 - countries and regions that are used 
in the World Gas Model. For larger regions in Figure 1 the numbers in parentheses 
indicate the number of sub-regions in the model. For example, the US consists of six 
model nodes. Our data set covers 98% of the total production and consumption in 2005 
(BP, 2008).  
Many different types of agents are active in the natural gas sector and many 
possible interactions may occur among them. Table 1 details the agents that are 
separately represented in the World Gas Model (WGM). The interactions between the 
market participants are summarized in Figure 2. The consumer markets may include both, 
the storage operators and the end-users with final demand.  
Producers sell gas to their trading arms and to domestic liquefiers. Traders ship gas 
to consumer markets, domestically via distribution networks (not represented in the 
model), and internationally via high pressure pipeline networks. Liquefiers ship gas to 
regasifiers in other countries. The regasifiers domestically sell gas to end user markets. 
Not shown separately in this picture are the deliveries from marketers to consumers and 









Figure 2: Natural gas export and supply chains 
 
2.2  MCP Formulation of the World Gas Model 
We tried to use notational conventions in the following model formulation that are mostly 
self-explanatory. Market player indices are the first letter of their full name. For example, 
SALES
X are the total sales of a market agent of type X. Also, SALES
XY are the sales of an 
agent of type X to an agent of type y and PURCH
YX are the purchases of an agent of type 
Y from agents of type X. Country nodes are denoted by indices from the set N, and 
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subsets of nodes where a player X is present, by N(x). To denote the subset of agents X 
present at node n, we use: X(n). Where necessary and appropriate, more variable and 
parameter names will be introduced. Greek letters are used the dual variables for 
restrictions that are added in parentheses and will be used when deriving the KKTs. 
2.2.1. Natural Gas Producers’ Problem 
The production of natural gas includes the well operation and the processing of the 
produced natural gas. We deal with the produced natural gas that is available for the 
market, i.e., without so-called “own use” or re-injection into gas fields. We consider one 
producer agent per production node (in general a country) that disposes of the aggregated 
production capacities in that node and decides on total production. 
The producer maximizes his discounted profits, which are the result of revenues 
from sales 
P
pdm SALES minus production costs. Cash flows in year m are discounted with a 
factor m γ . We implicitly assume that the production exactly equals the sales by the 
producer. Since we compute daily production (sales) which may take different values in 
each season, the sales rates are multiplied by the number of days in each season d:   d days




m d n p dm pdm pm pdm
SALES mM dD
days SALES c SALES γπ
∈∈
  −         (1) 
The daily production (sales) rate is restricted by a production capacity 
P
pm PR  (that can 
vary by year):  
( .. ,
P P
pm pdm pdm st SALES PR d m α ≤∀ )
P        ( 2 )  
Due to reserve limitations or governmental restrictions the aggregate production over all 
years in a time period can be restricted by a production ceiling  p PROD  
()
P P
p dp d m
md
days SALES PROD m p β ≤∀        ( 3 )  
Non-negativity of sales:        ( 4 )   0,
P
pdm SALES d m ≥∀
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2.2.1.1  KKT conditions for the producer problem 
To obtain the MCP model we take the first order conditions with respect to each decision 
variable (here:
P
pdm SALES ) of the profit maximization problem(s) to derive the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The following are the KKT conditions for the producer 
optimization problem which are necessary by the linearity constraint qualification and 









   ∂










SALES SALES d m
days
, ≥ ∀    (5) 
0
P PP





p dp d m p
mdD
PROD days SALES ≥
, ,
      ( 7 )  
 
The market-clearing conditions, and the market-clearing price  that tie the 









PT P L P P
pdm t p n p dm ldm npd m
lLp
SALES PURCH PURCH d p m π
←←
∈
≤− − ⊥ ≥ ∀   
2.2.1.2  Production input data and supply cost function 
While we use a generic convex production cost function in the above optimization 
problem we detail our specific choice next. We assume a functional form following 
Golombek et al. (1995), including a steep increase of production costs close to the 
capacity limit Q. 












  ,α > 0,β ≥0,γ ≤ 0,∀q:0≤ q < Q
 
                                                 
2 In practice this inequality holds as an equality and should hold as shown in Zhuang (2005). 
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q q C ln ' γ β α  and where Q is 
the production capacity, α is the minimum per unit cost term, β the per unit linearly 
increasing cost term, and γ a term that induces high marginal costs when production is 
close to full capacity. To derive the parameters α, β and γ we set the production rate q 
equal to the reference value of production in the base year.  
2.2.2. Traders’ Problem 
The traders in the WGM have a simplified role: they buy gas from one or more producers 
and sell gas to one or more final consumption markets. Examples of traders in today’s 
natural gas markets include Gazexport, the trading arm for Gazprom (Russia) and 
GasTerra for NAM (Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij). This modeling approach can 
represent both, a vertically integrated production and trading company (separate parts of 
the same overall organization with marginal cost internal accounting prices) as well as an 
independent trader that purchases gas from one or several producers. We distinguish two 
types of traders: 
A.  Traders operating only at the domestic node of the producer in case it is a small 
producer that does not export any gas. Previous papers (e.g., Boots et al., 2004) 
usually refer to this production as exogenous production, and do not model these 
quantities endogenously.  
B.  Traders that can operate at any consumption node that can be reached via 
pipelines through transit nodes from their own producer’s node.  
The trader maximizes profits resulting from selling gas to marketers ( ) and – 
in the low demand season,   - to storage operators (SA ), net of the gas 
+purchasing costs and the costs of using the transportation system () , a 






















[ ] , 0,1
C
tn δ ∈   indicates the level of market power exerted by a trader t at a 
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consumption node n; a value of 0 representing perfect competitive behavior and 1 
Cournot (oligopolistic) behavior. The expression   can  be 
viewed as a weighted average of market prices resulting from the inverse demand 
function   and a perfectly competitive market clearing wholesale price  . 
() () ,, (1 )
CW C W
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     
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tndm N t d m
−+





















i n dm ≥∀
 (8) 
The following mass balance equation ensures that the volumes bought from the producer 
and imported by pipeline must be enough to meet the total sales and the pipeline exports, 





























   (9) 
The remaining constraints enforce non-negativity of the decision variables: 
s.t. SAL          ( 1 0 )   0, , n d m ≥∀
, tn SALES n m          ( 1 1 )  
0( ( ) ) , PURCH n n p t d m ≥∀ = ,         ( 1 2 )  
0( , )( ) , ,
T
tn i FLOW n n A t d m ∈         ( 1 3 )  
Beside traders, regasifiers ( ) and, in the high and peak demand seasons, 
storage operators ( ) can sell gas to the marketers, too. Market clearing in the 
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INT SLP SALES n d m
SALES
)
W  (14) 
 
The market-clearing conditions between traders and storage operators in the low 





tnm sm n m
tTn sSn
SALES PURCH n N t N s m π
→←
∈∈
≤− ⊥ ≥ ∀ ∈ ∩  ( ) ( ) ,
)
L
                                                
   (15) 
KKT conditions for the trader and the following players’ optimization problems can be 
found in the Appendix. They are derived in the same way as described above for the 
producer, that is by taking the first-order conditions with respect to each decision variable 
and including the constraints. 
2.2.3. Liquefaction 
In the model, export LNG terminals (“liquefiers”) are represented as players that buy gas 
from a single producer (located in the same country node) and can sell it to regasifiers 
around the world. The liquefier player in the World Gas Model covers the liquefaction 
process including its internal optimization of LNG storage.  
The LNG market today is characterized by a large amount of contracted sales that 
imply that liquefiers have committed to sell a minimum amount of natural gas in general 
to a specific LNG importing country (regasifier). Where available, we include the data 
for contracts as a constraint in the model.
3 
The liquefier maximizes his discounted net profits from selling gas to regasifiers 
, minus costs to purchase the gas    and costs for liquefaction 











lm lm b Δ
 
3 We thank Sophia Rüster and Anne Neumann for sharing the contract information from their data base. 











nld m l d m
PL P L














   −  
 
−    

L
l m − Δ     (16) 
 
Sales rates in any year are restricted by liquefaction capacity. Liquefaction capacity can 
be expanded to be available in the following period. Therefore, the total liquefaction 
capacity in a certain year m is the sum of the initial capacity 
L
l LQF and the expansion 











ldm lm ldm l
mm
st SALES LQF d m α
<
≤+ Δ ∀  )
L
)
      ( 1 7 )  
Liquefaction losses are significant and have to be accounted for in the mass balance 
between purchases and sales: 
( (1 ) 0 ,
LP L L
l ldm ldm ldm loss PURCH SALES d m φ
← −− ≥ ∀      ( 1 8 )  
There can be regulatory, technical or budget restrictions limiting the capacity expansions 
in specific periods: 
(
LL L
lm lm lm m ) ρ Δ≤ Δ ∀           ( 1 9 )  
Non-negativity of the involved variables: 
0,
LP
ldm PURCH d m
← ≥∀          ( 2 0 )  
0,
L
ldm SALES d m ≥∀           ( 2 1 )  
0
L
lm m Δ≥ ∀           ( 2 2 )  
The market-clearing conditions between liquefiers and regasifiers are as follows, 
where the index b denotes the LNG tanker, running from node ns(b) to ne(b): 
 
()




ldm bdm n l dm
lLn l b nb n l
SALES PURCH d m π
←
∈=
≤− ⊥ ≥  , ∀
                                                
  (23) 
 
4 Capacity expansions cannot be executed instantaneously. Typically a multi-period run contains years that 
represent every fifth year in the time horizon. Five years are generally enough for addressing the time lag 
between a capacity expansion decision and the expansion to be constructed. 
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2.2.4. Regasification 
The following section describes the problem of the importing side in the liquefied natural 
gas market, the regasification.. Regasifiers can buy gas from liquefiers and sell it to 
domestic storage operators and to marketers. The regasifiers can exert market power 
relative to the marketers, thereby representing strategic behavior on the LNG market, 
similar to the traders for the pipeline market.  
Contrary to liquefiers, we may include more than one regasifier in a country 
depending on the country’s geography. This choice allows countries like Spain, France 
and Mexico to have LNG import capacity on their respective East and West coasts, 
thereby potentially providing interesting insights in the developments in the various 
global basins.
5  
The operational process of a regasifier includes the internal optimization of LNG 
storage in addition to the main activities of unloading the LNG vessels and bringing the 
vaporized (gaseous) natural gas into the pipeline system. Moreover, in the WGM the 
regasifier’s problem includes the optimization of LNG shipment by tankers. It is 
represented by a distance-based shipping cost and a gas loss rate that allow the regasifier 
to determine the optimal transport from any liquefier.  
The regasifier maximizes his discounted profits resulting from the sales to 
marketers   and storage operators   minus the costs to purchase and 
ship the gas , the re-gasification costs 


























                                                 
5 However, our simplified representation does not allow for representing recent developments such as co-
ownerships of LNG terminals such as the majority share of the French company GDF Suez and minority 
shares of Italian Publigas and others in the Belgian Zeebrugge terminal. 
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Sales (i.e, regasification) rates in any year are restricted by the regasification capacity. 
Regasification capacity can be expanded by an endogenous investment decision. Hence, 
the total capacity in a certain year m is the sum of initial capacity 
R
r REG and the yearly 










R RM RS R R
r rdm rdm rm rdm
mm
st
SALES SALES REG d m α
→→
<
+≤ + Δ ∀  )
)
    (25) 
The purchased gas, corrected for shipment losses ( ) and regasification losses ( ), 
must be greater or equal to the total sales: 
b loss r loss
(
:( ) ( )




r b bdm rdm RS
bn b n r rdm
SALES








−− − ≥ ∀   + 
  (26) 
Again, there can be regulatory, technical or budget restrictions limiting the capacity 
expansions in specific periods: 
( ()
RR R
rm ry m rm m ) ρ Δ≤ Δ ∀          ( 2 7 )  
The presence of contracts may impose a lower bound on purchases from a specific 
liquefier in a certain year:  
( () :( ) ( ) , ,
RL R R
bdm bdy m e bdm PURCH Contract b n b n r d m ε
← ≥∀ = )
,
     ( 2 8 )  
Non-negativity of the decision variables: 
0,
RM
rdm SALES d m
→ ≥∀         ( 2 9 )  
01
RS
rdm SALES d m
→ ≥∀ =          ( 3 0 )  
0: ( ) ( ) , ,
RL
bdm e PURCH b n b n r d m
← ≥∀ =        ( 3 1 )  
0
R
rm m Δ≥ ∀           ( 3 2 )  
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rm s m nm
rRn sSn
SALES PURCH n m π
→←
∈∈
≤− ⊥ ≥  1 , ∀     (33) 
 
2.2.5. Storage 
Natural gas storage can be used for a variety of reasons, including daily balancing and 
price arbitrage, seasonal balancing and as a strategic backup supply to overcome 
temporary supply disruptions or to meet peak demand on cold winter days. We focus on 
the seasonal arbitrage and assume the storage to be empty at the beginning and the end of 
each year. Storage can also be used to compensate disrupted supplies in our model. 
There are various types of gas storages: depleted reservoirs in oil and gas fields, 
aquifers, and salt caverns. Each of them has different characteristics relative to the 
amount of gas that can be stored and the speed with which the gas can be injected and 
extracted. In most countries, one type of storage is prevailing and we include these 
country-specific characteristics. 
The amount of gas available for operation is the working gas. Typically, gas 
installations have minimum and maximum injection and extraction rates. Compressors 
are used to generate pressure to be able to inject the gas in the storage. These 
compressors use some of the gas, therefore there is a loss rate associated with the 
operations. In the WGM, we assume that storage operators buy gas and inject it in the 
low demand season and extract gas and sell it in the high and peak demand seasons, as 
long as the seasonal price differential (corrected for the loss rate) is larger than the 
operational costs. 
The storage operator sells gas to the domestic marketer in the high and peak 
demand season:  . The gas is bought in the low demand season (of that same 
year) and injected into storage. Costs are made for purchasing the gas from the traders 
 and  regasifiers  , and to inject the gas into storage 
. To expand capacity for injection, extraction or total 
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     (34) 
 
Injection rates in any year are restricted by the injection capacity. Capacity can be 
expanded, therefore the total capacity in a year is the sum of initial capacity 
S
s INJ and the 







Δ  (36) and (37) for extraction 
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mm
st
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days SALES WRKG m θ
→
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≤+ Δ ∀  ) s m      ( 3 7 )  
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−− ≥    +   
 ∀    (38) 
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SE X T SE X T SE X T




SW G SW G SW G
sm sy m sm m ρ Δ≤ Δ ∀ )
,
) )
         ( 4 1 )  
Non-negativity of the decision variables: 
02 , 3
SM
sdm SALES d m
→ ≥∀ =            ( 4 2 )  
0, ( (
ST
sm PURCH m t T s n
← ≥∀∈         ( 4 3 )  




← ≥∀           ( 4 4 )  
, 0
SI N J
sm m Δ≥ ∀          ( 4 5 )  
, 0
SE X T
sm m Δ≥ ∀          ( 4 6 )  
, 0
SW G
sm m Δ≥∀            ( 4 7 )  
 
2.2.6. Pipeline operator 
The pipeline operator is responsible for assigning available capacities of international 
high pressure pipelines to the traders needing transport capacity for exporting gas. 
Ownership, management and operation of the pipeline network are done differently in 
various countries. We assume in a simplified approach that the pipeline network is 
regulated such that the access to transport infrastructure for third parties is ensured and 
capacity is allocated on a willingness-to-pay basis. While this describes some markets 
realistically (e.g., in the USA), it is a hypothetical assumption for others (e.g., in Europe), 
albeit in line with the objectives of the European Commission (e.g., EC, 2003). 
It is necessary to address pipeline capacities in an economic natural gas market 
model since they limit the supplied volumes from producers to end-users. We simplify 
from engineering considerations of the flow problem (e.g., pipeline friction, pressure 
differentials between two nodes) due to their nonlinear properties that usually are not 
included in a MCP model.
6 We include pipeline capacities in level at the cross-border 
points, using annualized data. 
Some natural gas pipelines are bidirectional. In the model these pipelines are 
modeled with two separate capacities. Thus, there is no netting of flows. In a perfectly 
competitive setting this has no impact, since in an optimal solution (assuming strictly 
positive costs and/or losses) at most one direction will have positive flow. However, in a 
market power situation there is an incentive for traders to supply to other markets, often 
                                                 
6 Midthun (2007) presents a complementarity model taking into account the so-called Weymouth equation 
by using linearizing techniques. In contrast to our market model, he deals with the optimization of technical 
processes related to production and transport (in the Norwegian North Sea).  
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resulting in congested pipelines in both directions (see Egging and Gabriel, 2006, for a 
deeper analysis of this issue).  
The pipeline operator provides an economic mechanism to efficiently allocate 
pipeline capacity to traders. The pipeline operator maximizes the discounted profit 
resulting from selling pipeline capacity to traders,  . The regulated fees 
collected from the traders are assumed to equal the operating costs, therefore the profit 
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The assigned pipeline capacity can be at most the available capacity. Available pipeline 
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2.2.7. Transmission System Operator Problem 
The market agent that we assume to be responsible for expanding the pipeline network is 
the transmission system operator (TSO). The transmission system operator maximizes a 
function with revenues from congestion payments and investment costs of expansion of 
the pipeline network. This mechanism balances the pipeline investment costs and the 
added value to the market given by the added pipeline capacity. Hence, we represent the 
long-term optimization of the pipeline network. 
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The separation of short-term and long-term optimization ensures that there is no incentive 
to withhold long-term capacity expansion in order to increase congestion revenues in the 
short-term. However, given that the endogenous variables from one player (TSO) enter 
into the optimization problem (in the constraint set) of another player (the pipeline 
operator), this version of the World Gas Model is in fact an instance of a generalized 
Nash problem. As such, it is equivalent to a quasi-variational inequality. Under certain 
circumstances, one can solve an associated variational inequality (or mixed 
complementarity) problem to resolve it, as we do here. The optimization problem of the 
transmission system operator is given as follows: 
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2.2.8. Marketer, Distribution and Consumption Sectors  
The KKT and market-clearing conditions presented in the above sections represent the 
World Gas Model. Some market aspects are indirectly accounted for in the model. The 
main one is the final consumption by three sectors (electricity generation, industry, 
residential) that are represented via an aggregation of their respective inverse demand 
functions into a single inverse demand function, which in turn represents the marketer.  
For our analysis of the world gas market and the international trade flows, it is not 
necessary to include all different demand sectors in each country. Equation (14) in the 
trader problem (Section 2.2.2) shows the aggregate demand function. To simplify the 
model structure and limit the number of model variables, we include country aggregate 
inverse demand curves. However, the model is calibrated by sector level and the sector 
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level information is retained. Ex-post the demand for each sector can be calculated based 
on the individual inverse demand curves. As long as all sectors have positive 
consumption, we know that the aggregation to a single inverse demand curve does not 
change the obtained outcomes compared to sector-specific demand functions. 
The combination of all KKTs and the market-clearing conditions form the market 
equilibrium (MCP) model. Due to concavity of the profit functions
7, convexity of the 
cost functions and convexity of the feasible regions, the KKT points for this system are 
optimal solutions. 
3  Data Set 
We are interested in the international trade of natural gas, so most countries are 
represented as just one node. Large countries and/or countries active in several regional 
basins are split up into several nodes, such as the U.S.A., Canada, Russia, and Mexico. 
We deal with normalized units of natural gas (at 15°C temperature and 760 mmHG 
pressure as defined by the International Energy Agency, e.g., IEA, 2008a). The data set 
can be adapted for scenario runs (e.g., Huppmann et al., 2009); here we present the base 
case data set and assumptions. Our base year is 2005 and we need additional data input 
for the following model years 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025, 2030, 2035 and 2040.
8 We 
assume a 10% discount rate in the multi-period optimization. In general, we use data per 
day, distinguished by season (low, high and peak demand) where applicable. 
On the supply side, we must realistically include limits on how much can be 
produced and transported. These capacity constraints are based on existing facilities for 
the base year and include projects currently under construction for the second model 
period (2010).
9 Starting in 2010, there can be endogenous investments in transport and 
storage infrastructure. In order to maintain a MCP we assume continuous capacity 
                                                 
7 Since we are minimizing the negative of a concave profit function, we are effectively minimizing a 
convex function.  
8 The last two model years are not reported in the model results, but they are necessary to have a sufficient 
payback period for the model-derived, endogenous investments. 
9 We also include one exogenous reduction of capacity in 2015, namely the LNG terminal in Alaska which 
will cease operations by 2012. 
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expansions. The investment is limited in each period; where available we use projections 
to determine these limits, otherwise we include our own assessment.  
Production capacity data for the base year is based on information and forecasts in 
the technical literature (e.g., OME, 2005, Oil and Gas Journal). Production capacity is 
determined exogenously for all model periods (i.e., no endogenous investments). For 
future periods, we apply a growth rate to the base year capacity that is based on 
production growth projections with the PRIMES model for Europe (EC, 2008) and the 
POLES model for the rest of the world (EC, 2006).  
International pipeline transport is limited at the cross-border points. When there are 
several cross-border points between two adjacent country nodes, we aggregate the 
capacities of these points to a single bound. We use capacity data from GTE (2005, 2008) 
for intra-European transport. Data on pipeline capacity between the North American 
nodes
10 was obtained from the Energy Information Agency. For all other pipelines, we 
use company reports and websites as well as technical literature. For given pipeline 
expansions between 2005 (first model period) and 2008 (time of our data base 
construction), we exogenously include the realized capacities in the model year 2010. 
For new greenfield pipeline projects that are planned but do not exist yet, e.g. the 
Nabucco pipeline, we include a zero capacity in the first model year and allow for 
positive investments in later periods (with the exact period depending on the project). 
Storage capacities are obtained from IEA (2007) and GSE (2008) for existing facilities. 
GSE (2008) also provides projected capacities in Europe. 
The LNG transport value chain contains liquefaction, shipment and regasification, 
as explained above. Liquefaction and regasification capacity data for 2005 are from IEA 
(2007). For future capacity expansion limits, including new terminals, we use technical 
literature such as IEA (2008b), the Oil and Gas Journal, etc. For the downstream actor in 
the LNG chain, the regasifier, we additionally use GLE (2005) for Europe. Shipment is 
optimized by the regasifier, given the distance-based transport costs. Distances between 
each pair of liquefier and regasifier are obtained for the approximate location of the 
                                                 
10 North America is split into nine regions: Alaska, Canada-East and Canada-West, US-West, US-Rockies, 
US-Gulf, US-Midwest, US-East, and Mexico. 
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terminals using www.distances.com. There is no restriction on the trading pairs, and we 
do not include limits on the shipment capacity. 
We assume linear cost functions for the construction of incremental capacity of 
transport or storage. The parameters are averages based on reported project costs in 
technical literature such the Oil and Gas Journal and company information. In the LNG 
value chain, the parameters are chosen such as to reflect the fact that the infrastructure for 
the regasification of gas is less capital intensive than the liquefaction. For pipelines, we 
determine a base cost of 50,000,000 US-$ for a new capacity of 1 bcm/year between two 
nodes, based on industry cost reports. For each of the characteristics “greenfield project”, 
“very long pipeline” or “offshore pipeline”, this unit cost is doubled.  
Storage expansions comprise expansion of injection, extraction and working gas 
capacity. Building extra injection capacity is costlier (our assumption: 3,000,000 US-
$/mcm/d) than building extra extraction (500,000 US-$/mcm/d). For working gas the 
investment costs are 150,000 US-$/bcm. 
Short-run production costs and losses are similar to Egging et al. (2008) but have 
been updated. As explained in the model description above, the production cost function 
in the short term is a function of the produced quantity that increases strongly close to the 
production capacity limit (Golombek et al., 1995). The parameters for the cost function 
are derived from OME (2005) but had to be adjusted upwards in the calibration process. 
Short-term transport costs per pipeline are a linear function, related to the distance 
to be traveled and including royalties where applicable (e.g. for the pipeline through 
Tunisia). Similarly, losses for pipeline transportation are assumed to be higher for long-
distance pipelines, following Oostvoorn (2003). For LNG transport, we apply linear cost 
functions for liquefaction and for regasification. In the absence of detailed data, we use 
the same parameters for all countries. Shipment costs and losses, that are added to the 
regasification costs, are distance-based.  
The total demand function for natural gas is obtained from aggregating sector-
specific consumption for each country. The International Energy Agency, in its Monthly 
Natural Gas Survey (http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/surveys/archives.asp) reports 
consumption levels for the power sector, industry, residential/households and other 
categories for each month. We aggregate these data by season (low, high and peak 
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demand), with the monthly distribution depending on the geographic location of each 
country (with differences, e.g., between the Northern and the Southern hemisphere) and 
determine a parameter reflecting the intensity of seasonal change of demand. For each 
sector-specific demand, another price elasticity is assumed (between -0.25 and -0.75). For 
the construction of the demand function for each period, we also need a reference price. 
The 2005 prices are based on IEA (2007) and BP (2008). For future periods, we assume 
an annual growth rate in the willingness to pay of 3%, based on EC (2008). Total demand 
is then an aggregated function of the linear functions for each sector. 
4  Base Case Results 
The Base Case shows a steady increase of natural gas production over the whole period 
that results in a total global production level of about 3,900 bcm/y (3,700 bcm/y. of 
consumption after the subtraction of losses) in 2030 (Figure 3). LNG trade grows until 
2020 and then reaches a plateau close to 600 bcm/y. At that moment, LNG will account 
for approximately 15% of total natural gas production. The amount of natural gas 
domestically consumed in the producing countries drops from 60% to about 50% of total 
consumption, while the share of natural gas exported by pipeline remains relatively stable 
(30%). In other words, the international trade of natural gas and in particular the share of 







































Figure 3: Global consumption obtained from domestic production and imports per pipeline and 
LNG, in bcm per year 






























Figure 4: Development of wholesale prices in Europe and North America, in absolute levels (in 2005 







































Figure 5: Breakdown of the sources of North American consumption for all model years, in bcm per 
year 
As explained above, we assume a yearly price increase of 3% (in real 2005 US-
Dollars) for the construction of the demand functions. This price increase is reflected in 
the results, albeit with varying intensities. As shown in Figure 4, the price increase in 
North America is considerably more pronounced than in Europe, especially in the first 
model years. This is due to the strong increase in imports, in particular of LNG, due to 
the increasing demand and insufficient own production capacities in North America 
  Page 23 of 34   
before alternative domestic supply sources (from Alaska) come on-stream (Figure 5).
11 In 
2030, North America produces about 60% of its consumption domestically with the 
remaining 40% satisfied by LNG imports. 
In 2030, the Middle East, Russia and the Caspian region split the major part of 
their sales between Europe and Asia, with small amounts sold as LNG to North America. 
Total consumption in Europe in 2030 amounts to 667 bcm/y.; of this, 27 bcm/y. are 
supplied in the form of LNG, which accounts for 4% of total consumption, and 200 
bcm/y. are produced domestically. A large share of European consumption is imported 
from Russia and the Caspian region, but also from North Africa as pipeline gas (Figure 
6). Hence, in the competition for LNG in the Atlantic basin, North America would be 
able to take the lead because of its higher willingness to pay in the absence of other local 
sources. Europe, in contrast, can continue to rely on a number of pipeline import options 








































Figure 6: Breakdown of European consumption for all model years, in bcm/y. 
                                                 
11 The Base Case does not include unconventional resources that have recently been added to the North 
American reserves. We explore the impact of the large increase in North American production capacities 
that may result from shale gas production in a scenario in Huppmann et al. (2009). and Gabriel, S.A., R. 
Egging, H. Avetisyan, “An Analysis of the North American Natural Gas Market Using the World Gas 
Model.” (working title, forthcoming). 
“ 
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Asia consumes almost 850 bcm/y. in 2030 with Japan and Taiwan continuing to 
rely heavily on LNG imports that come to a large extent from the Middle East. China and 
India each produce half of their consumption domestically and import another 40% by 
pipeline from Russia, Myanmar, and the Caspian region. 
Liquefaction and regasification capacities over time are shown in Figure 7. While 
liquefaction capacities increase from 242 bcm in 2005 to 652 bcm/y. in 2030, 
regasification capacities expand even further from 491 to 945 bcm/y. Thus, we continue 
to observe proportionally higher regasification capacity than liquefaction capacity 
reflecting the flexible spot LNG trade that we assume at least for later model runs. There 
are certain spare capacities in order to meet seasonal demand or to benefit from the 
option of importing additional volumes of liquefied natural gas. Investment in LNG 
infrastructure is strongest at the beginning of the time horizon (where it is to some extent 
driven by the inclusion of projects currently under construction) and again in 2020. After 
2020, investments slow down due to the assumption of demand stagnation in many 
developed markets. 
 














Figure 7: Liquefaction and regasification capacities; in bcm/y.  
 
The pipeline capacity development is reported in Table 2 for those regions where pipeline 
trade plays an important role. One can see that Russia as well as the Caspian and the 
Middle Eastern regions are considerably expanding their pipeline capacities to Asia, in 
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particular after 2015, in many places with construction of new, greenfield pipeline 
projects. These new pipeline capacities can accommodate the large exports of natural gas 
to satisfy the strong Asian demand for natural gas. Europe continues to be an important 
pipeline market with decreasing domestic production and a stable demand for natural gas. 
In line with the minor role for LNG on the European market, some substantial pipeline 
capacity expansions are coming forward: above all from North Africa, but also from the 
Caspian region and the Middle East. 
 
Table 2: Pipeline capacities over time between selected world regions, in bcm/y. 





Caspian Middle  East  Asia-Pacific 
Africa 2005  49      
   2015  92      
   2030  130      
Ukraine, Be-  2005  208 29       
larus 2015  212 29       
 2030  213 29       
RUSSIA 2005  40 207 13    0 
   2015  87 230 13    0 
   2030  183 233  13    91 
Caspian 2005  7   118  8  0 
   2015  25   215  45  33 
   2030  52   247  45  117 
Middle East  2005  10   0 2 0 
 2015  26   2 6 0 
   2030  54   2 6  38 
Asia-Pacific 2005       20 
 2015       44 
   2030       148 
 
5  Conclusions 
We have presented an extensive model of the global natural gas markets, the flows and 
the infrastructure, called the World Gas Model. This multi-period model allows to take 
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into account endogenous investment decisions over the next decades while at the same 
time including market power in the pipeline and the LNG market. 
Our Base Case results confirm the results by larger energy system models and 
exhibit an increase in global natural gas trade in the next decades. However, the strong 
rise, in particular of LNG trade will not be sustained after 2020. The largest increase in 
natural gas consumption and imports will come from Asia where, consequently, the 
biggest expansion of infrastructure capacity takes place. 
The World Gas Model can be used for a variety of analyses of trends in the 
international natural gas and energy markets. In Huppmann et al. (2009) we presented 
several development scenarios until 2030, including such intriguing questions as the 
unconventional resource base in the U.S. which may trigger considerably less LNG 
demand and the advent of an alternative “clean technology” that would gradually replace 
natural gas. 
In Egging et al. (2009) we discussed the possibility and effects of a cartelization of 
the natural gas markets within the Gas Exporting Countries Forum. A simplifying 
representation of the cartel was achieved by modifying the model structure in order to 
incorporate a single trader of pipeline gas and a single LNG supplier for the cartel 
countries.  
Another extension of the model is the inclusion of stochastic aspects, that is to 
allow for several scenarios to realize with a certain probability. In such a model, the 
optimal reaction by the players is different to deterministic simulations because they have 
to prepare for all possible events. For example, a pipeline from Iran to Europe may be 
necessary in the future or not, depending on whether Iran and the Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum will be able to implement an effective cartel withholding strategy. If the 
probability of such a cartel is less than 100% it may still be optimal to built a pipeline, 
maybe with a smaller capacity, in case the Iranian gas will not be withheld. Some first 
stochastic WGM results are presented in Egging and Holz (2009) which complement the 
work in Gabriel et al. (2009) for scenario reduction methods applied to small natural gas 
networks. 
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Appendix: Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Conditions 
The KKT conditions of the producer problem are described above in Section 2.2.1.1. In 
the following we detail the KKT conditions derived from the optimization problems 
presented in Section 2.2. The combination of all the KKT conditions of all players and 
the market-clearing conditions form the World Gas Model as it is programmed in GAMS.  













 −Π+ −   
⊥≥ ∀
CM T M
t n ndm tndm T
dm t n d m CW T C W





                                         SALES t n d m
     (A.1) 
11 0
TT T S
dm n m t n m t n m days SALES t n m γπ φ
→  ≤− + ⊥ ≥ ∀  0 , , ,
, ( ( ) ) , ,







     (A.2) 
00
PT T P
d m ndm tndm tndm days PURCH n N p t d m γπ φ







d y m n nd m n nd m T
tnn dm i TT
tndm n n tn dm
days




 +  ≤⊥ ≥
+− −





TP l o w TS TM
tndm d tnm tndm
TT












  ≤− +− +  
 
⊥≥ ∀ ∈
     (A.5) 
 





























WM M R M W






INT SLP SALES n d m
SALES
   (A.6) 
 
  Page 31 of 34   


























≤− + ⊥ Δ ≥ 
LL L L
ml y m l d m l m l m
dD mm





lm ldm ldm l
mm
LQF SALES d m α
<
≤+ Δ − ⊥≥ ∀  0 ,      (A.9) 
0( 1 ) 0 ,
LP L L
ll d m l d m l d m loss PURCH SALES d m φ
← ≤− − ⊥ ≥ ∀      ( A . 1 0 )  
0
LL L
lm lm lm m ρ ≤Δ −Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀ 0         ( A . 1 1 )  
 
A.3  KKT conditions for the regasifier problem 
()
()












  ≤− Π + − + +  




CW T C W R R
dm rn d m r n r d m r d m r d m










SALES d m ∀







RR M R S
R rm rdm rdm



















0 , ∀ m
   (A.13) 




rb r d m
LR L R
d m n b dm b bdm
RL
bdm





−− − −  ≤+ 
⊥≥





≤− + ⊥ Δ ≥ 
RR R R
mr y m r d m r m r m
dD mm
b       ( A . 1 5 )  
0
RR R




R RR M R S R
r rdm rdm rdm rdm
mm
, REG SALES SALES d m α
→→
<
≤+ Δ − − ⊥≥ ∀     (A.17) 
  Page 32 of 34   
()




rb b d m















, ⊥ ≥ ∀
: ( ) ( ) , ,
∀
    (A.18) 
,
() 00 ,
RL R D S R
bdm bdy m bdm e PURCH Contract b n b n r d m ε
← ≤− ⊥ ≥ ∀ =    (A.19) 
 









γπ β φ θ
→
 ≤− + + + 
⊥≥ =






SS T S R
T sm sm sm
dmn s d m ST
sm
SS














+   ≤ ∂  
+− −
⊥≥ = ∀












+   ≤ ∂  
+− −
⊥≥
SS T S R
R sm sm sm
dy m n s d m SR
sm
SS







PURCH d m = ∀
0 , m ∀
, ∀
0 , m ∀
d s d m





S INJ S S INJ S INJ










≤− +⊥ Δ ≥ 
S EXT S S EXT S EXT
m sm sdm sm sm
dm m





SW G S SW G SW G
























≤− −    +   
⊥≥ ∀





S SI N J S T S R S
s sm sm sm sm
mm
INJ PURCH PURCH m α
←←
<





S S EXT S M S
s sm sdm sdm
mm
EXT SALES d m β
→
<





S SW G S M S
s sm d sdm sm
mm d
WRKG days SALES m θ
→
<=
≤+ Δ − ⊥ ≥  ∀     (A.29) 
  Page 33 of 34   
  Page 34 of 34 
,, ,
() 0
SI N J SI N J SI N J
sy m sm sm m ρ ≤Δ −Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀ 0         ( A . 3 0 )  
,, ,
() 0
S EXT S EXT S EXT
sy m sm sm m ρ ≤Δ −Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀ 0        ( A . 3 1 )  
,, ,
() 0
SW G SW G SW G
sy m sm sm m ρ ≤Δ −Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀ 0
0 ,
        ( A . 3 2 )  
 




d m nn dm nn dm nn dm days SALES d m γτ α ≤− + ⊥ ≥ ∀     ( A . 3 3 )  
'
'
0 i ii i
A OA A
nn nn m nn dm nn dm
mm
PL SALES d m α
<
≤+ Δ − ⊥ ≥ ∀  0 ,
, , n m
     ( A . 3 4 )  
 






≤− + ⊥ Δ ≥ ∀ 
  ii i i
OA O O
n nm m d n nd m n nm n nm i
dD mm




nn m nn m nn m i nn m ρ ≤Δ −Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀ 0 , ,        ( A . 3 6 )  